See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. An Ohio statute provides, in respect to student choice, that each school district must establish [p]rocedures to ensure that an appropriate racial balance is maintained in the district schools. Ohio Rev. . See, e.g., Columbus Bd. In light of the evident risk of a return to school systems that are in fact (though not in law) resegregated, many school districts have felt a need to maintain or to extend their integration efforts. Each of these premises is, in my respectful view, incorrect. PICS disagrees that the race tiebreaker was necessary to the Districts goals, even if the Court finds them to be compelling interests. Our cases recognized a fundamental difference between those school districts that had engaged in de jure segregation and those whose segregation was the result of other factors. Roberts cites to: Grutter, supra, at 327, 328, 334, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. What emerges is a version of strict scrutiny that combines hollow assurances of harmlessness with reflexive acceptance of conventional wisdom. These include the facially race-neutral means set forth above or, if necessary, a more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student characteristics that might include race as a component. But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. Bd. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education ( PICS ). If the Supreme Court affirms this holding, it will be a departure from that in Gratz and Grutter which specified diversity as a compelling state interest and emphasized the importance of considering race as only one factor in a holistic review of an applicants potential contribution to the diversity of the school. Gratz involved a system where race was not the entire classification. At Ballard, in 20052006when no class at the school was subject to the racial tiebreakerthe student body was 14.2 percent Asian-American, 9 percent African-American, 11.7 percent Latino, 62.3 percent Caucasian, and 2.8 percent Native-American. 3 Planning and Evaluation Dept., Seattle Public Schools, The Plan Adopted by the Seattle School Board to Desegregate Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Grade Pupils in the Garfield, Lincoln, and Roosevelt High School Districts by September, 1971, pp. App. . 05915, at 81. v. Seattle Sch. See also ante, at 1517 (Thomas, J., concurring). See supra, at 12. Swann, supra, at 6; see also Green v. School Bd. The district assigns students to nonmagnet schools in one of two ways: Parents of kindergartners, first-graders, and students new to the district may submit an application indicating a first and second choice among the schools within their cluster; students who do not submit such an application are assigned within the cluster by the district. See Hallinan & Williams, Interracial Friendship Choices in Secondary Schools, 54 Am. 05908, at 910, 47; App. The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race. A racial imbalance determination requires the district to submit a plan to correct the racial imbalance, which plan may include mandatory pupil reassignment. 10226e5(a) and (c)(4). Public Schools, 416 F.3d 513, 514 (2005) (McFarland II). v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 310 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). As to the dissent, the general conclusions upon which it relies have no principled limit and would result in the broad acceptance of governmental racial classifications in areas far afield from schooling. By this term, I mean the school districts interest in eliminating school-by-school racial isolation and increasing the degree to which racial mixture characterizes each of the districts schools and each individual students public school experience. Asian, Hispanic, White, etc. It also contends that racial diversity is too amorphous and uncertain a concept to be considered a compelling interest, and finally disputes as inconclusive the Districts statistics regarding the increased success rates of students in integrated schools. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 316 (1986) (same). See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Brief for Petitioners at 27. Even if the district maintains the current plan and reinstitutes the racial tiebreaker, Seattle argues, Parents Involved members will only be affected if their children seek to enroll in a Seattle public high school and choose an oversubscribed school that is integration positivetoo speculative a harm to maintain standing. That decision not only expressed our appraisal of the merits of the appeal, but it constitutes a precedent that the Court overrules today. See App. But the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution required the disestablishment of de jure segregation. [12] In order to survive strict scrutiny analysis, "a narrowly tailored plan" must be presented in order to achieve a "compelling government interest. 539 U. S., at 316, 335336. in No. Public Schools, 416 F.3d 513 (2005); Memorandum from Stephen W. Daeschner, Superintendent, to the Board of Education, Jefferson Cty. The Jefferson County Board of Education fails to meet this threshold mandate. If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race. Moreover, Parents Involved also asserted an interest in not being forced to compete for seats at certain high schools in a system that uses race as a deciding factor in many of its admissions decisions. Ibid. Compare Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 809810 (CA1 1998) (Boudin, J., concurring), with Comfort, 418 F. 3d, at 2829 (Boudin, C.J., concurring). Get Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. L.Rev. As the panel majority in Parents Involved VI concluded: [T]he tiebreakers annual effect is thus merely to shuffle a few handfuls of different minority students between a few schoolsabout a dozen additional Latinos into Ballard, a dozen black students into Nathan Hale, perhaps two dozen Asians into Roosevelt, and so on. 06AppsChoicesBoardApril2005final.pdf. The first consists of the District Court determination in the Louisville case when it dissolved its desegregation order that there was overwhelming evidence of the Boards good faith compliance with the desegregation Decree and its underlying purposes, indeed that the Board had treated the ideal of an integrated system as much more than a legal obligationthey consider it a positive, desirable policy and an essential element of any well-rounded public school education. Hampton II, 102 F.Supp. United States v. Montgomery County Bd. Parents in Louisville, Kentucky and Seattle, Washington argued that those districts' school integration programs - each of which was voluntarily adopted by local school boards to promote racial integration - violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978).) (PDF) Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District It gave fourth preference to students who received child care in the neighborhood. Roberts, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IIIA, and IIIC, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IIIB and IV, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. And if Seattle School Dist. Here Roberts provides the following string citation: quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 156 L. Ed. Moreover, these cases are not governed by Grutter v. 10 important Supreme Court cases about education 05908, at 284a. Section 3. 2002), but then withdrew its opinion, finding that the appeal turned on an unsettled question of state law which the state courts would best be able to answer in the first instance. The notion that a democratic interest qualifies as a compelling interest (or constitutes a part of a compelling interest) is proposed for the first time in todays dissent and has little basis in the Constitution or our precedent, which has narrowly restricted the interests that qualify as compelling. App. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373374 (1886). For Brown held out a promise. 1996); see also T. Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical Study 141165 (2004). of Boston v. Board of Education, 389 U. S. 572 (1968) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of a federal question a challenge to a voluntary statewide integration plan using express racial criteria). 05908, at 162a. The district has identified its purposes as follows: (1) to promote the educational benefits of diverse school enrollments; (2) to reduce the potentially harmful effects of racial isolation by allowing students the opportunity to opt out of racially isolated schools; and (3) to make sure that racially segregated housing patterns did not prevent non-white students from having equitable access to the most popular over-subscribed schools. Id., at 19. Voluntary School Diversity Efforts A decade ago, on June 28, 2007, the United States Supreme Court issued its ruling in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District ("PICS"), the only 1, 2, and 4 p.65 (That the Constitution is color blind is our dedicated belief); Brief for Appellants in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1952, No. It is evident, however, that Justice Breyers brand of narrow tailoring is quite unlike anything found in our precedents. They are located in every region of the country and range in size from Las Cruces, New Mexico, with barely over 15,000 students attending 23 schools in 1968, to New York City, with more than one million students in 853 schools. 1, 2, 4, 18 (1978 Memo & Order). In Grutter, in the context of law school admissions, we found that these types of interests were, constitutionally speaking, compelling. See 539 U. S., at 330 (recognizing that Michigan Law Schools race-conscious admissions policy promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break down racial stereotypes, and enables [students] to better understand persons of different races, and pointing out that the skills needed in todays increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original)). 1 McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. See id., at 152 (opinion of Stewart, J.). 05908, pp. Jefferson County Public Schools operates the public school system in metropolitan Louisville, Kentucky. The Current Plan, 1999 to the Present. Id. Hence, their lawfulness follows a fortiori from this Courts prior decisions. Overall these efforts brought about considerable racial integration. of Ed., 402 U. S., at 16far more heavily than the school districts themselves. This plan is in place as of 2017. Aside from constitutionally compelled remediation in schools, this Court has permitted government units to remedy prior racial discrimination only in narrow circumstances. None of the considerations trumpeted by the dissent is relevant to the constitutionality of the school boards race-based plans because no contextual detailor collection of contextual details, post, at 222can provide refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race. Adarand, 515 U. S., at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). to reject the argument that a race-conscious plan is permissible only when there has been a judicial finding of de jure segregation. 610 F.2d, at 663664. In the 20002001 school year, for example, with the racial tiebreaker, the entering ninth grade class at Franklin High School had a 60% minority population; without the racial tiebreaker that same class at Franklin would have had an almost 80% minority population. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 507 (1989); Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.) B1, B5. The allocation of governmental burdens and benefits, contentious under any circumstances, is even more divisive when allocations are made on the basis of individual racial classifications. School authorities concerned that their student bodies racial compositions interfere with offering an equal educational opportunity to all are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student in different fashion based solely on a systematic, individual typing by race. 05908, at 308a. 36, 7172 (1873)). On the other hand, if the Court chooses not to give deference to the School District, school boards may lose some of their decision-making discretion, which could result in diminished community support. 1? Section 7. Cf. To make race matter now so that it might not matter later may entrench the very prejudices we seek to overcome. [Footnote 30] See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. Neither of the programs before us today is compelled as a remedial measure, and no one makes such a claim. [Footnote 11] But see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547, 610 (1990) (We are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities knitted together with various traditions and carried forth, above all, by individuals) (OConnor, J., dissenting). Because the referendum would have prohibited the adoption of a school-integration plan that involved mandatory busing, and because it would have imposed a special burden on school integration plans (plans that sought to integrate previously segregated schools), the Court found it unconstitutional. Before the Lawsuit, 1954 to 1972. VI (1978) (prescribing percentage enrollment requirements for minority students); Siqueland 55 (discussing HEW definition of minority). Of these, 2.3 million were black and Latino students, and only 72,000 were white. After decades of vibrant life, they would all, under the pluralitys logic, be written out of the law). Remediation of past de jure segregation is a one-time process involving the redress of a discrete legal injury inflicted by an identified entity. 2d 290, 294 (1967); Booker v. Board of Ed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. One commentator, reviewing dozens of studies of the educational benefits of desegregated schooling, found that the studies have provided remarkably consistent results, showing that: (1) black students educational achievement is improved in integrated schools as compared to racially isolated schools, (2) black students educational achievement is improved in integrated classes, and (3) the earlier that black students are removed from racial isolation, the better their educational outcomes. Even if current social theories favor classroom racial engineering as necessary to solve the problems at hand, post, at 21, the Constitution enshrines principles independent of social theories. 3, p. 76 (As time passes, it may well be that segregation will end), with post, at 19 ([T]hey use race-conscious criteria in limited and gradually diminishing ways); post, at 48 ([E]ach plans use of race-conscious elements is diminished compared to the use of race in preceding integration plans); post, at 55 (describing the historically-diminishing use of race in the school districts). 2d 902 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); brackets omitted). Justice Breyers position comes down to a familiar claim: The end justifies the means. See Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. Seattles racial tiebreaker results, in the end, only in shifting a small number of students between schools. 1 uses an open choice plan in which students rank their preferred schools. The plurality is wrong to do so. The conclusions he has set forth in Part IIIA of the Courts opinion are correct, in my view, because the compelling interests implicated in the cases before us are distinct from the interests the Court has recognized in remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination and in increasing diversity in higher education. PICS did not respond to this argument in either of its reply briefs. The plan that was the source of this litigation allowed students entering the ninth grade to rank the schools they wanted to attend. Approximately 34 percent of the districts 97,000 students are black; most of the remaining 66 percent are white. In addition to classroom separation, students of different races within the same school may separate themselves socially. 1, p.38 (Spring 2002); Mickelson, Subverting Swann: First- and Second-Generation Segregation in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 38 Am. Finally, what of the hope and promise of Brown? Indeed, in the context of school desegregation, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of acknowledging that local school boards better understand their own communities and have a better knowledge of what in practice will best meet the educational needs of their pupils.